Gen-Z Protests (2025) in Nepal and the Challenges of Small Arms Proliferation:
Background, Findings, and Recommendations
Author(s): Camélia Elaoufi | Mulki Ismail
Editor(s): Shreya Pandey | Purna Shova Chitrakar
Publisher: Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal (NCBL)
Publisher's Address: Dallu, Kathmandu, Nepal
Edition: 2025/1st Edition
© 2025 Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal (NCBL)
All rights reserved.
Publisher’s Page
The Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal (NCBL) was established with the mission to protect people in Nepal from the dangers of landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and other explosive remnants of conflict. Since its inception, NCBL has expanded its efforts from raising public awareness to becoming a leading voice for disarmament, humanitarian protection, and the rights of survivors. The organization was actively involved from the outset of the armed conflict in Nepal in 1996, advocating for the government to join the Mine Ban Treaty, supporting survivors, and providing Mine Risk Education in affected communities. NCBL is affiliated with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL-CMC), which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997.
NCBL is primarily dedicated to advocacy, Mine Risk Education, and victim assistance. In recent years, the organization has expanded its focus to include issues related to gender, small arms, and the impact on marginalized communities. NCBL has actively engaged in both national and international initiatives on small arms non-proliferation, working alongside UNRCPD and other UN bodies. While Nepal was declared landmine-free in 2011, the persistent threats posed by IEDs and small arms continue to affect rural families, children, and survivors, particularly in regions still grappling with the legacy of conflict. This ongoing risk underscores the critical need for sustained efforts in education, advocacy, and support services to protect and uphold the safety and dignity of those affected by the enduring impacts of conflict.
This media monitoring report synthesizes current concerns and priorities in the context of the recent Gen-Z protests, the looting of weapons and ammunition, and the potential long-term implications for armed violence and conflict. Based on a thorough review of 25 news reports from 16 different sources, along with 20 police reports sourced from the Nepal Police News Portal, the report underscores the urgent need for risk education for vulnerable communities. It also calls for stronger national commitments to the safe management and eventual
elimination of explosive devices and small arms. Furthermore, the report reiterates NCBL’s long-standing position that support for survivors must be long-term, comprehensive, and rooted in respect for their rights. Rehabilitation, economic inclusion, and community acceptance are critical to ensuring that survivors can live with dignity and rebuild their lives in the aftermath of conflict.
Through this report, NCBL hopes to clarify and inform researchers, civil society and other stakeholders to the current trends of the usage and proliferation and use of small arms from the side of the government, as well as protestors, and points to their possible dangers and future trends.
NCBL’s network now spans much of the country, and its activities include mine risk education in schools and communities, sustained dialogue with government officials, research on weapons contamination and collaboration with national and international partners. All of this work reflects our central message: disarmament is not only a technical task. It is a humanitarian responsibility that affects development, public health and social harmony. As Nepal continues to move forward, NCBL urges all stakeholders to renew their commitment to preventing further harm and to invest in safer futures for the next generation, and hopes that this report supports informed action and deepens public understanding of the continued dangers posed by IEDs and small arms.
Finally, NCBL extends its appreciation to all team members for their contributions to this report. NCBL also thanks Mines Action Canada (MAC) for supporting this work through its youth internship program, as well as the interns themselves, who, though based outside Nepal, assisted NCBL throughout the process.
Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal (NCBL)
Dallu, Kathmandu, Nepal
Email: info.ncbl@gmail.com
Website: naya.com.np/@ncbl
Facebook: facebook.com/theNCBL
Youtube: youtube.com/@theNCBL
Introduction
In September 2025, Nepal experienced a wave of protests that marked a significant departure from previous demonstrations in recent years. These protests arose in response to allegations of governmental corruption, compounded by circulating videos that showcased the lavish lifestyles of the nation's ruling elite. Tensions intensified, particularly among the younger generation, due to a controversial government decision, ultimately leading to an uprising against the administration, leading to a complete shutdown of the government system. What distinguishes this movement from previous protests, however, is the prominent participation of Generation Z.
It is noteworthy that the majority of the protesters were relatively young. With over 56% of Nepal's population under the age of 30, the movement was shaped by this age group (Mulmi, 2025). This also meant that the protest relied heavily on social media and digital platforms for organization and mobilization, despite the government's recent executive orders aimed at blocking access to major social media sites like Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, and YouTube (Mulmi, 2025).
While social media has increasingly played a role in organizing protests, the movement in Nepal still exhibited traditional protest characteristics, such as the use of weapons, acts of violence from both protesters and law enforcement, infrastructure damage, and instances of weapon theft. At its core, however, the protests reflected years of growing frustration over perceived government corruption, high levels of youth unemployment, and a ruling political class that many believed to be disconnected from the realities faced by the country's citizens.
This report will explore the use of weapons and violence in the protests, as well as issues of accountability. Additionally, it will examine the origins of the protests and consider the broader impact that these events may have on the trajectory of democracy in Nepal.
Curbing Social Media: A Catalyst for Change
Nepal is among several South Asian countries where citizens have mobilized against economic inequality and alleged governmental corruption, inspired by protests in Indonesia and the Philippines in early 2025. But the mobilization of Nepali youth and students, which provided these protests with the label of “Gen Z” protest, was supported by social media in several ways.
Beyond serving as a platform for communication, social media became a tool for highlighting the stark wealth disparities between ordinary Nepalis and the political elite. Children of high-ranking political families frequently posted images and videos showcasing their opulent lifestyles, attracting millions of views and sparking widespread outrage. Additionally, this inspired the terms “#Nepokids” and “Nepobabies,” as a critique of the wealth and privilege the elite few had access to. In response, protesters used social media to draw attention to the stark contrast between the lavish lives of the political elite and the harsh realities faced by the average Nepali citizen, particularly the stagnation of public services (Mulmi, 2025).
In addition to public services stagnating, youth unemployment was rising, which is a particularly important issue in a country with many young people. The government’s apparent indifference to these issues fueled feelings of frustration and helplessness among the protesters. Additionally, the growing number of corruption allegations against the Nepali government intensified the sense of disillusionment (Mulmi, 2025). To many, these scandals reinforced the perception that the government operated above scrutiny, and this perspective grew stronger when the government announced it would block access to multiple social media platforms including Facebook, Instagram, Youtube and X.
Although the government officially said this was for safety, many viewed it as censorship and suppression of disagreements with governmental policies (Beech, 2025). As a result, online communities such as Discord, played an important role in organizing discussions, outreach, and strategic coordination.
In summary, these combined factors: social media censorship, economic inequality, corruption, and political disconnection, created an environment ripe for protest. The banning of social media served as the catalyst for mobilization, and the grievances of the protesters found their expression both online and in the streets.
Mobilization and Marches
September 2025 began with the rapid mobilization of youth. On September 6th, activist Sudan Gurung posted on his Instagram, “Do not stay silent. Do not stay home. Bring your friends, your family, your courage, and your voice.” Gurung also announced the creation of the Discord Channel “Youths Against Corruption,” as a “central communication system” for the protests (Mulmi, 2025). Demonstrators issued several demands, including the immediate reversal of the social media ban, the resignation of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli, the establishment of an independent anti-corruption body, and accountability for officials implicated in corruption.
On the morning of September 8, thousands of young protesters gathered in the neighborhood of Maitighar, Kathmandu, particularly around government buildings, such as the Parliament building and the Prime Minister Oli Sharma’s private residence (The Kathmandu Post, 2025a). Nepalese Journalist Sahana Vajracharya told Human Rights Watch she saw a “sea of protesters, many in school uniforms.” By approximately 12:35 p.m., demonstrators breached barricades and entered the Parliament grounds. Additional crowds mobilized in other cities across the country (Beech, 2025).
Although the initial demonstrations were largely peaceful, tensions rose as marchers approached restricted areas and as some entered the Parliament building . When tear gas and rubber bullets failed to deter the protesters, the Special Task Force (STF) fired live bullets from inside the Parliament building (The Kathmandu Post, 2025d). According to Kathmandu Valley Police spokesman Shekhar Khanal said that 17 people were killed in the capital, and another 2 people were killed in the eastern city of Itahari while protesting after curfew order was announced (Walker & Dahal, 2025). Official state media also reported that security forces responded with tear gas and rubber bullets as crowds attempted to breach parliamentary defenses.
In response, demonstrators vandalized and set fire to government buildings, and targeted symbols of state authority including offices and courthouses. Some participants were school students, identifiable by their uniforms. Human rights observers noted that the escalation from nonviolent to violent clashes was rapid and intense (ABC, 2025). This opening day set the tone, what began as a rights protest quickly shifted into a confrontation with the state’s use of force. The unrest that began on September 8 quickly escalated into a nationwide crisis.
Figure 1: Breakdown of casualties of the September 2025 protests
The protests continued the next day, including after Prime Minister Oli Sharma resigned. By September 12, former Supreme Court Chief Justice Sushila Karki was inaugurated as the interim Prime Minister, and the death toll had reached 51 (Reuters, 2025a; Al Jazeera English, 2025). By September 13th, calm seemed to have returned to Kathmandu, and the curfew was lifted. The final toll was devastating, over 70 people killed and more than 2,000 injured. Within days, the attention turned to the growing evidence of excessive force and the widespread theft of weapons from police armories. In a press release issued by the Nepal Army spokesperson in November, it was reported that the casualties included 22 protesters, 10 escaped convicts, 3 police officers killed by demonstrators, and 41 individuals believed to have perished in “looting, arson, or fires” that the victims had started; more than 2,100 people were also reported to be injured (The Kathmandu Post, 2025e).
Weapons, Use of Force, and Forensics
On September 17, Nepali officials confirmed that more than 1,100 firearms had been looted during the violent protests (The NepaliPost, 2025). A subsequent internal inventory revealed a more precise figure: 1,276 rifles and pistols were reported stolen, along with 98,491 rounds of ammunition (Nepal News, 2025). By mid-October, authorities announced plans to conduct extensive operations to recover the looted weapons. Some local reports suggested that a portion of the looted firearms may have included higher-grade weapons, though this remains unconfirmed. The significant discrepancy between looted weapons and recovered arms underscores the risk of proliferation and the challenge of state control in the aftermath.
Figure 2: Breakdown of rounds fired by province. Kathmandu Valley and the rest of Bagmati province has been differentiated due to the difference in the amount of cases
Despite recovery efforts, the Nepali Army had only managed to retrieve a fraction of the stolen firearms by the end of October, with reports indicating that approximately 300 firearms had been recovered. Many of these weapons were returned at the request of the Nepali Army, which urged the public to return them voluntarily to avoid prosecution. Possessing weapons without authorization is a punishable offense, with up to three years in jail and a fine of up to NPR 30,000 (Nepal News, 2025). These stolen weapons are particularly difficult to find, as they are often hidden in ordinary people’s homes, or storerooms. Another 100 are believed to have been destroyed in fires that damaged police outposts in the Kathmandu Valley.
However, the Nepali authorities have found some success in recovery of the stolen weaponry. For example, on September 14, police recovered 750 rounds of ammunition in Banepa Municipality, and on September 24, two suspects were arrested in Lalitpur with seven pistols and in October 2025, police in Banke, police detained a man discovered to have a fully loaded pistol looted during the protests (Satyal, 2025). Despite these efforts, only a minority of the stolen weapons have been recovered. As of late October, the Home Ministry reported that 500 weapons had been returned, with 600 still unaccounted for. This marks an additional 200 weapons returned since the Home Ministry’s public notice urging the return of stolen weapons by mid-October (Nepal News, 2025).
The escalation to live-fire and lethal force introduces serious questions of command responsibility, chain-of-custody, and state-sanctioned violence. Police internal logs document over 13,000 instances of firearms being discharged across the country over two days during the crackdown. Of these, 2,642 rounds of live ammunition were recorded as fired. Most of the firing happened in the Kathmandu Valley, where 1,329 live bullets, 1,420 rubber bullets, and 1,046 warning shots were recorded. Additionally, 3,096 tear gas shells were fired. In total, the Kathmandu Valley witnessed 6,891 instances of firing. After the Valley, the highest use of force was reported in Madhesh province, with 1,921 firings, followed by Koshi 1,568, Karnali 932, Sudurpaschim 763, Lumbini 619, Gandaki 306, and other districts of Bagmati province 181 firings. Other crowd-control munitions used included 1,884 rubber bullets, 2,377 warning shots, and 6,279 tear gas shells (The Kathmandu Post, 2025e). The weapons deployed included INSAS rifles, SLR rifles, and pistols. In internal police assessments, most of the bullets fired were from lethal weapons rather than non-lethal crowd-control tools. These firing patterns indicate that the security response moved beyond typical dispersion tactics, relying substantially on lethal munitions (The Kathmandu Post, 2025e).
Figure 3: Pie-charts breaking down the details of the rounds fired. The topmost chart displays the frequency of firings in the Kathmandu valley, while the bottommost chart displays the frequency of firings in the rest of the country.
Forensic medical examinations by the Tribhuvan University Institute of Medicine provided the first confirmed evidence that live ammunition was used against protestors. At least 33 protesters were found to have been shot by high-velocity bullets, with only a single death attributed to a rubber bullet. To illustrate the impact of high velocity weapons, they can usually fire a projectile at over 600 meters per second. These deceased demonstrators were struck in vital areas, 10 had been struck in the head, 18 in the chest, 4 in the stomach and 2 in the neck. These findings strongly suggest that lethal force was used, rather than relying solely on crowd-control methods (Reuters, 2025d).
The violence not only resulted in deaths and injuries among protesters but also led to retaliation against police officers. On September 9, mobs attacked police stations in Kathmandu, targeting officers inside (Poudel, 2025). This escalation highlighted the growing tensions between demonstrators and security forces, marking a significant shift in the conflict.
Investigations, Oversight, and Aftermath
In addition to the tragic loss of life and the thousands of injuries sustained, the protests caused extensive damage to infrastructure and public buildings (CBC, 2025). Economic losses were estimated in the billions of Nepalese rupees (The Kathmandu Post, 2025b), resulting from fires, vandalism, and the destruction of government properties. Chief Cabinet Secretary Eknarayan Aryal announced that the government would officially recognize the victims of the protests, offering compensation of 1 million rupees to the families of those who lost their lives (Mali, 2025).
Both the Nepal Police and the Nepali Army issued public appeals urging the return of looted weapons and ammunition, highlighting the significant security risks posed by their widespread dispersal. As of October 2025, there are still about 800 weapons missing, and the implications are beyond simply a policing issue. They have become a symbol of institutional fragility and growing public mistrust.
Figure 4: A chart illustrating the percentage breakdown of weapons that are missing, recovered, destroyed, and whose status is unknown
With national elections for the House of Representatives scheduled for March 2026, including the selection of a new Prime Minister, the loss of police morale, destruction of posts, and the unaccounted-for arms presented serious structural challenges to restoring public order (Nepal News, 2025). This period represents a crucial transition in Nepal’s political climate, from crisis to investigation, recovery, and potential political reckoning. How thoroughly and impartially the investigations into the violence and its aftermath were conducted would become a central measure of the state’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
A Deeper Dive into Reports by the Nepal Police
An alternative gauge to assess the state of the country in the aftermath of the movements, particularly with respect to the weapons used during the unrest, their entry into black markets, and their subsequent confiscation by law enforcement, can be found through the Nepal Police’s official news portal. This portal offers insight into the ongoing challenges of weapon proliferation and related activities. Traditional news media has reported that some individuals have voluntarily returned firearms looted during the unrest to security agencies, yet these returns do not appear in the police’s official incident reports. Instead, the reports frequently highlight the confiscation of a broad spectrum of firearms, both locally produced and imported. These include Bharuwa (muzzle-loading guns), Katuwa (homemade pistols), revolvers, rifles such as INSAS and XLR models, shotguns, and various improvised firearms.
According to compiled incident records across a period of 2 months (62 days from 8 September to 9 November), security agencies have confiscated the following: one homemade sixer pistol; seven Katuwa pistols; several revolvers and shotguns; multiple rifles, including an INSAS rifle; and a gas gun. Additionally, the police have recovered 36 magazines, approximately 730 rounds of ammunition, 33 SLR rifle rounds, and various shell casings. The reports also list the recovery of 14 grams of explosive material and 4 explosive devices, and raw materials intended for producing explosive devices. (See Nepal Police section in Works Cited for more information)
The range of weapons seized by law enforcement underscores the continued presence of illegal small arms within the country. Of particular concern are the reports of attempted robberies involving counterfeit firearms, which demonstrate the adaptability of such elements in circumventing security measures. Some incidents also involve the police apprehending people that were planning to sell these weapons. Additionally, hoax devices and pressure cooker bombs have been discovered in several public areas, further illustrating the ongoing threat posed by illicit explosives. Not only that, some incidents actually turn up with real explosives or explosive materials for building IEDs. These findings indicate a troubling pattern: while the direct looting of weapons may have been mostly limited to the immediate period following the protests, the black market for firearms and explosives remains a significant issue.
These incidents suggest that the illegal trade and use of small arms persist across Nepal. The frequency of weapons seizures, combined with the discovery of explosives, paints a stark picture of the ongoing challenges faced by law enforcement in curbing the illicit arms trade. Moreover, it is evident that the use of explosive materials has not been fully eradicated, posing a continuing risk to public safety and security. The resilience of these illegal networks highlights the complexity of the problem and suggests that significant efforts are still needed to address the flow of both firearms and explosives into the hands of criminals.
In conclusion, while the return of looted weapons may indicate some recovery, the persistence of illegal arms trafficking and the ongoing use of explosives signal that the security situation in Nepal remains fragile and requires sustained attention from both law enforcement and policymakers.
The Roles that Civil Society Can and Should Play
In the wake of significant social and political unrest following the Gen-Z protests, civil society has a vital role to play in addressing the risks of violence, promoting peace, and ensuring long-term stability. The following are key actions that civil society can and should take to contribute to rebuilding trust, preventing further conflict, and creating a safer, more just society.
Raise Awareness About the Dangers of Weapons
Civil society should actively raise awareness about the dangers associated with the widespread possession of firearms, as well as IEDs, especially in politically unstable environments. This includes educating the public about the potential consequences of unregulated weapons, such as increased violence and the destabilization of communities. By informing citizens about the risks of weapon proliferation, civil society can help reduce the likelihood of further violence. Efforts should focus on encouraging individuals to return looted weapons and refrain from keeping them, while also educating communities on the importance of maintaining a weapons-free society.
Civil society can play an essential role in launching educational campaigns to engage the public and especially youth, on the risks of illegal weapons. By utilizing both traditional media and digital platforms like social media, these campaigns can spread messages about the dangers of armed violence and the need for disarmament. Targeted outreach efforts in schools, local community centers, and online platforms will ensure that these messages reach as wide an audience as possible, encouraging citizens to actively participate in the process of returning weapons and avoiding the spread of violence.
Teach Peaceful Conflict Resolution
Civil society organizations should organize programs aimed at teaching peaceful conflict resolution. These programs can provide people with the skills necessary to resolve disputes without resorting to violence. By focusing on education and awareness, civil society can promote nonviolent communication, negotiation techniques, and peaceful approaches to resolving grievances. This is especially important for young people, who can learn early on how to handle conflicts in constructive ways, reducing the likelihood of violence in future disputes.
Facilitate Dialogue Between Stakeholders
One of the most crucial roles civil society can play is in fostering dialogue between the government, protest groups, and other stakeholders. By organizing and facilitating discussions, civil society can ensure that all parties have an opportunity to voice their concerns and work through their differences in a peaceful and productive manner. Encouraging open communication is essential for preventing further polarization and creating the conditions for long-term peace. Civil society can act as a neutral mediator, helping to bridge divides and find solutions that work for all involved.
Promote Inclusivity in National Dialogue
Civil society should advocate for the inclusion of diverse voices in national dialogue processes. This means ensuring that marginalized groups, youth, and protestors are given a platform to express their concerns and participate in decision-making. By promoting inclusive dialogue, civil society can help build a sense of ownership among all stakeholders and create a more equitable political environment. This collaborative approach helps to ensure that solutions are not only imposed top-down but are shaped by the collective input of all affected groups, reducing the potential for future unrest.
Push for International Cooperation
Civil society can and should work with international organizations to ensure that Nepal upholds its commitments to disarmament and arms control. By engaging with global institutions such as the United Nations and regional partners, civil society can help combat the illegal arms trade and ensure that weapons do not flow across borders or into the hands of those who seek to destabilize the country. Working collaboratively with international actors also strengthens Nepal’s commitment to global peace and security, fostering better relationships with neighboring nations and contributing to regional stability.
Advocate for Stronger Arms Control Measures
Civil society should continue to push for stronger arms control policies within Nepal. This includes advocating for legislation that regulates the sale and possession of firearms, cracking down on illegal arms trafficking, and ensuring that weapons are stored and handled safely. Civil society can work with lawmakers to implement stronger enforcement of these laws, promoting greater transparency in the arms trade and improving the effectiveness of security forces in preventing violence. By advocating for arms control, civil society helps mitigate the risks of further violence and ensures that weapons do not become tools for political or social instability.
Refocusing on the Field of Disarmament
In the face of growing global militarization, the weakening of long-established commitments to major disarmament treaties, and the severe reduction in funding for organizations dedicated to promoting peace and disarmament, civil society needs to take on a more active role. Citizens, grassroots movements, and advocacy groups can serve as a powerful voice for reason, urging governments to return to the negotiating table and re-engage in serious dialogue about disarmament. Through concerted public pressure and discourse, nations can be reminded of their responsibility to pursue peaceful solutions and prioritize global security over escalating arms races.
Civil society can play a crucial role in helping Nepal recover from conflict and build a more peaceful, stable society. Through education, dialogue, and advocacy, it can support healing and rebuilding, ensuring future generations are better prepared to resolve conflicts peacefully and work towards the common good.
Conclusion
The protests led by the youth of September 2025 were not simply an eruption of anger; they marked a turning point in Nepal’s modern history. Triggered by a ban on social media, they revealed a deep frustration that built up over decades. It also showed on an international scale the resilience and responsibility of a new generation.
Images circulated online of volunteers cleaning debris after the clashes, which many interpreted as a gesture of hope and renewal. This duality symbolized that the movement was not only about tearing down failed systems, but also about the hope of building something new.
The digital dimension of the protests, youths using platforms like Discord were effectively used for coordination and debate among youth organizers and was unprecedented in Nepal’s political history and may well redefine how future generations engage with politics. Around 150,000 users of Discord joined the Youths Against Corruption for a debate and an election on who should become the next interim Prime Minister of Nepal. This was the first time in Nepal's history that a federal election was created through an online platform, involving hundreds of thousands of participants. The digital voting process not only demonstrated a shift away from traditional party politics but also revealed a broader rejection of the established political system. This development could reshape how future generations in Nepal engage with politics, potentially setting a new precedent for digital democracy.
In tandem with this shift, civil society plays a crucial role in fostering peace and stability in the aftermath of unrest. By raising awareness about the dangers of weapon proliferation, launching educational campaigns, and promoting peaceful conflict resolution, civil society can help reduce violence and encourage constructive dialogue. Facilitating conversations between the government, protest groups, and other stakeholders is essential for finding common ground and preventing future conflict. Additionally, civil society can advocate for stronger arms control measures and work with international partners to ensure Nepal’s disarmament commitments are met. These efforts are vital for rebuilding trust, creating a safer environment, and shaping a more peaceful and inclusive future for Nepal.
For NCBL, this involves the ongoing support of its risk education and survivor assistance programs. The organization remains committed to aiding survivors of landmines, IEDs, and armed violence. In the context of rising global militarization, the erosion of long-standing disarmament commitments, and the defunding of organizations advocating for peace, NCBL believes civil society can serve as a crucial voice for reason. The organization hopes to inspire a renewed commitment to peace, encouraging nations to return to the negotiating table and engage in meaningful dialogue on disarmament.
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